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DOES CRIMINAL LAW DETER? 
A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INVESTIGATION 
(24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004)) 
 
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Contents 
Abstract 
Table 1: The Problem of Low Punishment Rates 
  Table 2: The Problems of Adaptation and Duration Neglect 
____________ 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Having a criminal justice system that imposes sanctions no doubt does deter criminal 
conduct.  But available social science research suggests that manipulating criminal law rules 
within that system to achieve heightened deterrence effects generally will be ineffective.  
Potential offenders often do not know of the legal rules.  Even if they do, they frequently are 
unable to bring this knowledge to bear in guiding their conduct, due to a variety of situational, 
social, or chemical factors.  Even if they can, a rational analysis commonly puts the perceived 
benefits of crime greater than its perceived costs, due to a variety of criminal justice realties 
such as low punishment rates.  These conclusions are reinforced by studies of crime rates 
following rule changes.  Many show no change in deterrent effect.  Those that purport to show 
a deterrent effect commonly have persuasive non-deterrence explanations, such as a change in 
incapacitative effect.  The few studies that segregate deterrent and incapacitative effects tend to 
reinforce the conclusion that rule formulation has a deterrent effect only in those unusual 
situations in which the preconditions to deterrence exist.  Even there, the deterrent effects are 
quite minor and unpredictable, hence inadequate grounds to influence criminal law rule 
making. 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Below are provided tabular data and graphical representations of material contained in 
the Article.  The first section, “The Problem of Low Punishment Rates,” provides data 
regarding the relatively low rates of capture, conviction, and punishment for a variety of 
offenses.  The second section, “The Problems of Adaptation and Duration Neglect,” provides 
graphical representations of the punishment amount experienced by prisoners, and shows how 
punishment amount and the length of prison terms have a more complex relationship than is 
traditionally assumed. 
THE PROBLEM OF LOW PUNISHMENT RATES 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Type of Offense (a) 
Number 
Committed 
(b) 
Number 
Reported 
(% of col. a) 
(c) 
Number of 
Arrests 
(% of col.. a) 
(d)  
Number 
Convictions  
(% of col. a) 
(e) 
Prison Sentence 
(% of col. a) 
(f) 
Avg. Sentence 
Imposed 
(months) 
(g) 
Avg. Time 
Served 
(months) 
Total 25,505,600 10,264,938 
(40.2%) 
2,229,674 
(8.7%) 
330,372 
(1.3%) 
242,708 
(1.0%) 
78 40 
(51% of col. f) 
Murder and 
Non-Negligent 
Manslaughter 
NA 13,896 
--- 
13,227 
(95.2%) 
Fed = 345 
State = 9,158 
(68.4%) 
Fed = 283 
State = 8,792 
(65.3%) 
Fed = 94.2 
State = 263.0 
Fed = 63.6 
State = 136.0 
Rape 147,160 76,939 
(52.3%) 
27,469 
(18.7%) 
Fed = 347 
State =11,622 
(8.1%) 
Fed = 311 
State = 9,762 
(6.8%) 
Fed = 84.5 
State = 147.0 
Fed = 46.1 
State = 81.0 
Robbery 
 
 
 
731,780 377,457 
(51.6%) 
106,130 
(14.5%) 
Fed = 1,514 
State = 38,784 
(5.5%) 
Fed = 1,579 
State = 34,130 
(4.9%) 
Fed = 93 
State = 106.0 
Fed = 59.5 
State = 54.0 
Assault 
 
 
 
5,330,010 808,776 
(15.2%) 
478,417 
(9.0%) 
Fed = 286 
State = 71,060 
(1.3%) 
Fed = 253 
State = 51,163 
(1.0%) 
Fed = 33.0 
State = 66.0 
Fed = 27.1 
State = 38.0 
Burglary 
 
 
 
3,443,700 1,807,157 
(52.5%) 
289,844 
(8.4%) 
Fed = 58 
State =,87,957 
(2.6%) 
Fed = 57 
State = 65,968 
(1.9%) 
Fed = 32.6 
State = 52.0 
Fed = 25.0 
State = 24.0 
Larceny-Theft 
 
 
14,915,900 6,109,538 
(41.0%) 
1,166,362 
(7.8%) 
Fed = 1,470 
State = 93,253 
(0.6%) 
Fed = 1,394  
State = 57,958 
(0.4%) 
Fed = 27.3 
State = 37.0 
Fed = 12.8 
State = 17.0 
Motor-Vehicle  
Theft 
  
937,050 1,071,175 
(114.3%) 
148,225 
(15.8%) 
Fed = 150 
State = 14,368 
(1.5%) 
Fed =139  
State = 10,920 
(1.2%) 
Fed = 28.0 
State = 35.0 
Fed = 23.2 
State = 15.0 
 
 Column (a):  U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2000 Statistical Tables,  
Table 91, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus00.pdf.  [last visited May 15, 2003] 
 Column (b):  Offenses known to police (2000), Table 3.112, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t3112.pdf.   
 Column (c): Estimated number of arrests (2000), Table 4.1, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t41.pdf.   
 Column (d): Disposition of cases terminated in U.S. District Courts (2000), Table 5.17, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t517.pdf (federal).  Felony convictions in State courts (1998), Table 5.42, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics 2001, at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t542.pdf (state). 
 Column (e):  Defendants sentenced in U.S. District Courts (2001), Table 5.25, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t525.pdf (federal).  Felony sentences imposed by State courts (1998), Table 5.43, at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t545.pdf  (state) (numbers determined by converting percentages incarcerated back to totals through Table 
5.17 supra). 
 Column (f): Sentences imposed in cases terminated in U.S. District Courts (2000), Table 5.19, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, 
at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t519.pdf (federal).  Mean and median length of felony sentences imposed by State Courts (1998), Table 
5.46, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t546.pdf (state).  
 Column (g): Time served to first release by Federal prisoners (2000), Table 6.52, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t651.pdf (federal).   Estimated time to be served in State prison (1998), Bureau of Justice Statistics, Table 
1.5, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf98.pdf (state). 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF ADAPTATION AND DURATION NEGLECT 
 
 
 The studies in the text suggest that the reality of the prison experience is better 
represented by Bar 2 below (the adaptation calculation), rather than by Bar 1 (the naive 
calculation system).  Consider those two bars.  Assume that the affect associated with a day in 
prison is a negative 1.  (We will now drop the negative sign, since it will be constant in all of 
the calculations.  That means that a larger number represents an experience that is affectively 
worse than an experience with a smaller number.)  Therefore, under what we have called the 
naive calculation system in Bar 1 a jail term of 100 days is registered as 100 negative units, 
since we assume the affect associated with a day in prison is always about the same as the 
affect associated with any other day in prison.  Under the assumption of Bar 1, if we double the 
length of prison sentence we double the punishment achieved. 
 But the empirical findings we cite above hold that the perceived negativity of each 
objectively equally awful day of punishment experience perceptually declines somewhat over 
the period of time that the person spends in confinement.  This is shown for the 100 day period 
in Bar 2 below.  Note the implication for the total punishment amount of the longer period.  By 
the end of the 50th day of the sentence, the intensity of the punishment experienced is less than 
it was at the start of the sentence.  The next 50 days does not accomplish a doubling of the 
punishment, because the intensity of the punishment has already declined and continues to 
decline over the remaining period.  Without attempting to assign a precise value in punishment 
units, the value of the 100 day prison experience will be significantly less that the 100 
punishment units experienced under the naive assumptions in Bar 1. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAR 1 
 “Naïve Calculation” Total Punishment 
Unit Calculations*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intensity = 1 
 
100 units 
Duration = 100 days  
 
 
 
     BAR 2 
        “Adaptation Calculation” 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Duration = 100 days 
Intensity = 1 
<100 
>50 
units
Intensity = .5 
*  Punishment unit calculation = Intensity x Duration  = total area within the bar 
 
 This aspect of adaptation to punishment is problematic because it means that 
imprisonment becomes increasingly less cost-efficient as punishment.  Each unit of prison time 
will have a near constant cost, but the punitive bite of each unit will become increasingly less. 
 Still, it is important to see that what remains common to both of these representations is 
that the duration of the negative experience is a strong determinant of the negative quality of 
the experience that is retained in memory by the punished individual.  More specifically, the 
duration of the punishment interacts multiplicatively with its intensity to produce the total 
punishment amount of the prison experience.  In the Bar 2 cases, the intensity of the 
punishment declines as the days pass, so we have to multiply the duration of the punishment by 
the average intensity rather than assuming the high and level intensity shown in Bar 1.  This 
general assumption of the approximate multiplicative effect of the duration of punishment is 
the conventional wisdom. 
 However, recent psychological research suggests that duration does not play anything 
like the major role that intuition gives it in determining punishment amount.  Instead, in these 
experiments the amount contributed by duration to the remembered experience of pain was 
small.  In other experiments, participants generally declined to experience a shorter period of 
intense pain, and preferred to experience a longer period that began with an intense pain of the 
exact duration of the one in the shorter period, and then, without the subjects becoming aware 
of it, added a period of less-intense pain.  If duration were given the weight that conventional 
wisdom assumes, the subjects would have chosen to repeat the shorter pain experience.  But 
they did not.  To explain these results,  Kahneman suggests that people retain a ‘snapshot’ of 
the negative experience that pools by averaging two aspects of the painful episode:  the 
affective value of the most extreme pain experienced during the episode and the affective value 
of the pain experienced near its end.   
The results of these studies are completely neglected by the conventional wisdom, 
which includes the duration of the punishment as a multiplicative determinant of its total pain 
as depicted in Bar 2 (reproduced below).  Under the duration-influenced punishment 
calculation, for the sentence in Bar 2, which lasted 100 days, the punishment effect is less than 
100 and more than 50, depending on the precise extent and timing of the adaptation step-downs 
in intensity.  But the remembered punishment amount registered under the ‘duration neglect’ 
calculation of Bar 2 is the average of the sum of the maximum intensity (1, at the start) and the 
end intensity (.5), giving a total remembered punishment amount of 75+. 
 Now compare this to a much shorter sentence, as represented in Bar 3 below, which 
represents a relatively short sentence that manages to be as aversive at its end as at its 
beginning.  The startling realization is that this short sentence will be experienced as more 
aversive than a much longer sentence that is equally aversive at the beginning but less so at the 
end!  The point here is that lengthening sentences may actually reduce their recalled negative 
character if the end experiences are relatively less aversive! 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAR 2 
                                                   “Standard Duration Calculation” 
 
Standard “Duration”       “Duration Neglect”  
Calculation*       Calculation**  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Intensity = 1 
Intensity = .5 
<100 
>50 
.75+ 
 Duration = 100 days 
 
 
 
      BAR 3 
                                                     “Duration Neglect Calculation” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intensity = 1 
25
 
1.0 
Duration = 25 days 
*  Standard “duration”  
     calculation:    Intensity  x  Duration  (total area within the bar) 
 
** “Duration Neglect” 
     calculation:    Maximum Intensity + End Intensity     (memory of a longer duration is a minor extra feature, represented by a “+”) 
     2             
 34
                                                                                                                                                                                           
100 Levitt reports that: 
States in which juvenile punishments are lenient relative to adult punishments see much greater declines 
(or smaller increases) in crime as a cohort passes to the adult court.  For example, in states in which the 
juvenile courts are most lenient vis-a-vis the adult courts, violent crimes committed by a cohort fall by 3.8 
percent on average when the age of majority is reached.  In contrast, violent crimes rise 23.1 percent with 
passage to the adult criminal justice system in those states in which the juvenile courts are relatively harsh 
compared to the adult court. 
Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, above n [6] at 1159. 
101  Terry M. Williams, The Cocaine Kids: The Inside Story of a Teenage Drug Ring (1989) at 19. 
102  Anup Malani, Does the Felony Murder Rule Deter?  Evidence from the FBI Crime Data (unpublished 
manuscript). 
103  Ibid at 22. 
104  Ibid at 305. 
105  One could speculate that those criminals who know of the felony-murder rule and nonetheless have undertaken 
the offense are persons who have already judged that the risk of death-causing conduct is worth taking. 
106  See Robinson & Darley, At Its Worst, above n [7], at ??. 
107 Our conclusions are consistent with another recent review of aggregate effect studies authored by Anthony Doob 
and Cheryl Marie.  See Anthony Doob and Cheryl Marie Webster, ‘Sentence Severity and Crime:  Accepting the 
Null Hypothesis’ in Michael Tonry (ed) Press.Crime and Justice: A Review of Research.  Volume 30 (2003). As 
they point out, ‘most of these reviews (of the impact of sentence severity on crime levels) have concluded that there 
is little or no consistent evidence that harsher sanctions reduce crime rates in western populations.’  They argue that, 
based on the weight of the evidence, including recent evidence made available by ‘three strikes’ laws, we should 
now accept the conclusion that we will not obtain general deterrence effects by alterations in sentence severity that 
are ‘within the limits that are plausible in western countries.’   
 
108  See V.A.C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree at 59-60 (1994). 
